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SUPREME COURT ADVOCACY AND
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
LESSONS FROM VERMONT V. BRILLON
AND OTHER CASES BEFORE THE COURT
CHERYL HANNA*
INTRODUCTION

This Symposium, entitled Thinking Outside the Box: New
Challenges and New Approaches to Domestic Violence, asks
those of us participating to focus on new approaches to domestic
violence law. One of the most important strategies is to broaden
and expand advocacy before the United States Supreme Court. In
recent years, the Court has heard numerous cases that implicate
the interests of domestic violence victims either directly or
indirectly. These cases involve a range of issues, including
reproductive rights, 1 federalism, 2 search and seizure, 3 double
jeopardy, 4 procedural due process, 5 the defense of duress, 6 rights
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. The author thanks St. John's University School
of Law, especially Professor Elaine Chu, for hosting this symposium. Thanks also to
Emily Sack and Gil Kujovich for comments on earlier drafts, to my research assistants
Amanda George and Clare Cragan for their assistance, and to Ginny Burnham for her
editorial assistance. The author can be reached at channa@vermontlaw.edu.
1 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871-78 (1992) (discussing a
state's right to regulate abortion); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546
U.S. 320, 323 (2005) (determining the appropriate remedy if enforcing a statute
forbidding abortion in a medical emergency is unconstitutional).
2 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (deciding whether a federal civil
remedy can be applied to gender motivated crimes).
3 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (holding that a warrantless search is
unconstitutional as to a defendant who is physically present, even if his wife consents to
the search).
4 United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 691 (1993) (determining whether a defendant
is barred by double jeopardy from being tried for a crime related to a contempt of court
charge).
5 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 750-51 (2005) (discussing whether a
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to gun ownership, 7 speedy trial rights,8 international law, 9

criminal contempt proceedings,O and the Confrontation
Clause. 1 ' The sheer number of cases on the Court's docket
evinces that domestic violence law has now reached a new level
of maturity and sophistication.
Most of the recent cases before the United States Supreme
Court reflect both the progress toward, and the push back
against, numerous statutory and policy reforms aimed at
providing domestic violence victims greater remedies, resources,
and protection. For example, in the 2008-2009 term, the Court
decided United States v. Hayes, 12 which involved a federal law
known as the Lautenberg Amendment after its sponsor, Senator
Frank Lautenberg.13 Under the law, those convicted of a
domestic violence crime or subject to a restraining order are
prohibited from owning or using a gun. The Court held that
whenever the battered victim was in fact the wife or another
relative of the offender the underlying offense did not need to

individual has a property interest in seeing that a restraining order is enforced by the
police when they have probable cause to believe it has been violated).
6 Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (examining whether due process was
violated by rejecting the petitioner's jury instruction that the burden of production and
disproof of her affirmative defense was on the Government).
7 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787-88 (2008) (considering whether
a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home
violates the Second Amendment); United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1082 (2009)
(determining whether the element of domestic violence must have been present in a
previous violent misdemeanor offense in order for the Federal Gun Control Act to apply).
8 Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1287 (2009) (deciding whether the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated).
9 Abbott v. Abbott, 524 F3d 1081, cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2559 (2009) (deciding
whether a clause that prohibits one parent from removing a child from a country without
the other parent's consent confers a "right of custody" within the meaning of the Hague
Convention on International Child Abduction).
10 Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 940 A.2d 1050, cert. granted, 130 S.Ct.
1011 (2009) (considering whether an action for criminal contempt in a congressionally
created court may constitutionally be brought in the name and pursuant to the power of a
private person rather than the United States).
11 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004) (considering whether a defendant
has the right to confrontation when the out-of-court statements sought to be introduced
are testimonial); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006) (determining when
statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are
"testimonial" and subject to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause); Giles v.
California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2681 (2008) (considering whether a defendant forfeits his
Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a
wrongful act by the defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial).
12 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009).
13 18 U.S.C.S § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1997) (noting that the legislation was sponsored by
Senator Lautenberg).
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include the element of a domestic relationship as long as the
state could prove a domestic relationship existed beyond a
reasonable doubt. This ruling ensures a broad application of the
Lautenberg Amendment, thus providing greater protections for
victims.
This case stands in contrast to United States v.
Morrison, in which the Court struck down the civil rights remedy
under the Violence Against Women Act. 14 Both cases grew from
tremendous legislative successes achieved by advocates for
victims of domestic violence that convinced Congress to enact
federal solutions to intimate violence.
Others cases reflect the great strides that the criminal justice
system has made in arresting and prosecuting abusers. Take for
examples cases like Davis v. Washington & Hammon v.
5 and Giles v. California.1
6 These cases, which involved
Indiana,1
the scope of the Confrontation Clause when a witness is
unavailable to testify, made their way to the Court after a decade
of policies that encouraged the prosecution of domestic violence
cases based on the evidence rather than on the testimony of the
victim. Similarly, Georgia v. Randolph,17 which involved the
question of whether a co-occupant can consent to a search of the
premises over the objection of the other co-occupant, signals the
significantly improved police response to domestic violence.
Dixon v. United States,1 8 a case assigning the burden of proof
when a criminal defendant raises a duress defense, reveals the
growing awareness that women who find themselves in the
criminal justice system are often victims of domestic violence.
Similarly, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales19 reflects the
commitment of lawyers to seek redress for victims when the state
fails in its duty to provide adequate protection from private
violence even when the victim has sought a court order of
protection. Gonzales is now pending in the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, marking a paradigm shift that finds that state
failure to provide victims with adequate protection is a violation
14 Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
15 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
16 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
17 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006).
18 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
19 545 U.S. 748, 750-51 (2005).
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of international human rights.
Overall, the Court's record on domestic violence has been
mixed.
Cases like Morrison and Gonzales have been
disappointing. Others, like Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and
more recently, United States v. Hayes, have been positive. Yet,
even in those cases that were not decided favorably, the Court
continues to demonstrate a growing sophistication about and
concern for the problems posed by intimate violence. It is true
that in many cases, like Georgia v. Randolph, some members of
the Court appear to use domestic violence concerns
instrumentally to support a broader doctrinal agenda. 20 Yet,
rather than assign Machiavellian motives to domestic violence
references, I prefer to see any mention of domestic violence and
any expressed concern for victims as a positive development in
the Court's jurisprudence. The mere fact that the dynamics of
domestic violence are part of the Court's dialogue is a
tremendous step in the right direction.
In many cases before the Court, the domestic violence advocacy
community (DVAC) has done an outstanding job of coordinating
strategies, particularly in the filing of amicus briefs. I use the
term "domestic violence advocacy community" to refer to those
organizations and individuals who have demonstrated a longstanding commitment to combating intimate partner violence. 2 1
While it's true that no one group or individual can claim to
"speak" on behalf of all victims, there are now a number of
national and state non-profit organizations, private law firms,
legal scholars and practitioners that have been coordinating
efforts and pursing similar legal and policy agendas. Many
scholars and advocates have been doing remarkable appellate
work. Most notably, Joan Meirs, founder of the Domestic
Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (DVLEAP)22
20 See infra p. 34.
21 I include in this group the National Network to End Domestic Violence, the
Battered Women's Justice Project, the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, the
Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Advocacy Project, the National
Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, the Center for Survivor Agency and
Justice, the state-based coalitions, as well as the many other organizations, law firms,
and individuals who have devoted their careers to these issues. I use the term DVAC
inclusively to capture the vast network of advocates and do not mean to exclude anyone
group or individual that considered themselves part of this broader advocacy community.
22 Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, http://www.dvleap.org
(last visited Apr. 20, 2010).

20101

SUPREME COURTADVOCACYAND DV

at George Washington University Law School, was instrumental
in coordinating the domestic violence community's input via
25
24
23
amicus briefs in the critical cases of Gonzales, Davis, Giles,
Hayes,26 Abbott,27 and Robertson.28 The National Network to
End Domestic Violence (NNEDV)29 and the National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (NCADV)30 have also been doing
great work in filing amicus briefs, especially in cases where the
interests of victims may be less obvious. For example, in both
District of Columbia v. Heller,31 which involved the
interpretation of the Second Amendment, and Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood of N. New England,3 2 which involved the
reproductive rights of minors, these organizations filed amicus
briefs that highlighted the practical implications for victims of
the Court's decisions. Many of these efforts have been aided by
the generous pro bono work of private attorneys. In particular,

23 See Brief for Nat'l Black Police Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL
328203; see also Brief for Nat'l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04278), 2005 WL 353608; Brief for Nat'l Coal. Against Domestic Violence & Nat'l Ctr. for
Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353985.
24 See Brief for The Nat'l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Davis v. Washington & Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813
(2006) (Nos. 05-5224, 05-5705), 2006 WL 284229.
25 See Brief for The Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (DV
LEAP) et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678
(2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 859396; see also Brief for The Battered Women's Just.
Project & Other Domestic Violence Orgs. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Giles
v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 859393.
26 See Brief for The Nat'l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009) (No. 07-608), 2008
WL 2468546.
27 See Brief of the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, et, al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Abbott v. Abbott, 129 S.Ct. 2559 (2009) (No.
08- 645) 2009 WL 4247974.
28 As of the publication of this article, the DVLEAP amicus brief in support of the
respondent has not yet been filed.
29 The National Network to End Domestic Violence, http://www.nnedv.org/ (last
visited Apr. 20, 2010).
30 The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, http/www.ncadv.org/ (last
visited Apr. 20, 2010).
31 Brief for The Nat'l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No.07290), 2008 WL 157199.
32 Brief for National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 807
(2005) (No.04-1144), 2005 WL 2598159.
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Mintz Levin 33 has been invaluable in offering assistance and
support in the filing of amicus briefs before the Court, as well as
doing outstanding appellate work generally. The firm has
prioritized its pro bono efforts toward eradicating domestic
violence and has established the Domestic Violence Project to
assist the DVAC. The sheer number of people and organizations
already involved in Supreme Court advocacy is breathtaking and
a testament to the maturity of the field and growing
sophistication of the DVAC.
While the DVAC has been doing outstanding work,
opportunities remain to expand the scope of its impact on the
Court's jurisprudence. In hindsight, there have been some cases
in which the DVAC should have filed an amicus brief, but missed
the opportunity to do so. Georgia v. Randolph34 is perhaps the
most striking example of how the lack of involvement by the
DVAC allowed the interests of victims to be defined by the state,
and in conflicting ways by the Court, instead of by victims
themselves. 35 As I outline in greater detail later in this article,
in Randolph, five Justices discussed domestic violence in
conflicting and contradictory ways. Thus, it appears that some
Justices may have disingenuously exploited the concerns of
victims in order to advance their own position. Similarly,
Crawford v. Washington36 and its requirement that testimonial
evidence be subject to cross-examination under the Confrontation
Clause, has frustrated the prosecution of domestic violence
offenders. 37 Yet, no one in the DVAC submitted an amicus brief
in the case. An amicus brief would not likely have changed the
outcome in Crawford, but it could have mitigated some of the
damage. This observation is not intended as a criticism of any
particular group or individual. Rather, it is intended to highlight
the continued opportunities and challenges the DVAC faces as it
provides even more sophisticated legal advocacy before the Court.
33 Mintz Levin Cohen Ferris, Glovesky and Popeo, PC, http'J/www.mintz.com/about
.php?AboutID=7 (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (noting the firm's commitment to domestic
violence pro bono work).
34 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
35 See infra p. 25.
36 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that testimonial evidence must be subject to crossexamination under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause).
37 Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBatterersAfter Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 768 (2005)
(discussing Crawford'spotential to hinder domestic violence prosecution).
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I. WHY FILE AMICUS BRIEFS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES?

Participating in Supreme Court advocacy through amicus
briefs is important for a number of reasons. First, amicus briefs
can significantly impact the Court's decision. The Supreme
Court's rules regarding amicus briefs are quite liberal. Supreme
Court Rule 37 states that an amicus brief "that brings to the
attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its
attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the
Court." 38 Procedurally, those seeking to file a brief only need
obtain either the written consent of all parties or permission from
the Court. 3 9 As a result of these liberal rules, amicus briefs are
40
commonly filed and considered by the clerks and the Justices.
For example, Justice Samuel Alito, while still on the Third
Circuit, stated:
Even when a party is very well represented, an amicus may
provide important assistance to the court. "Some amicus
briefs collect background or factual references that merit
judicial notice. Some friends of the court are entities with
particular expertise not possessed by any party to the case.
Others argue points deemed too far-reaching for emphasis by
a party intent on winning a particular case. Still others
explain the impact a potential holding might have on an
industry or other group." Accordingly, denying motions for
leave to file an amicus brief whenever the party supported is
in some instances deprive the
adequately represented would
41
court of valuable assistance.
A well-crafted amicus brief that brings to the Court new
arguments or interpretations, particularly the practical effects of
a decision, can help to influence the outcome of a case. One can
point to a number of cases outside the domestic violence context,
including Grutter v. Bollinger4 2 and Roper v. Simmons,43 in
38 Brief for anAmicus Curiae, SUPCT. R. 37.1 (2005).
39 SUP.CT. R. 37.2.
40 See Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus
CuriaeBriefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004).
41 Neonatology Assocs. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 293 F.3d 128, 132 (3rd Cir.
2002) (citing Luther T. Munford, When Does the CuriaeNeed An Amicus?, 1 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 279 (1999)).
42 539 U.S. 244, 299 (2003) (referring to the amicus brief in the majority opinion).
43 543 U.S. 551, 617-18 (2005) (citing results from a study referenced in a submitted
amicus brief in the majority opinion).

574

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:3

which the participation of amici significantly impacted the
Court's opinion.
Second, some studies suggest that the Court is influenced by
the shear numbers of amici that weigh in on a particular issue. 4 4
This signals to the Court the amount of public interest in the
case. 4 5 To the extent that the Court functions as a quasidemocratic institution, signaling heightened concern about a
particular case may, at the very least, urge the Court to consider
more serious arguments advanced by amici. 4 6
Third, such briefs provide the Court with empirical facts and
theories about intimate violence that would otherwise not be
presented in briefs by the parties. 4 7 The most effective amicus
briefs do not duplicate the brief on the merits, but rather provide
the Court with extra-record evidence and the broader policy
considerations. Take, for example, the Court's opinion in Giles v.
California.48At issue in Giles was whether a defendant forfeits
his Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation by engaging in
wrongdoing that results in the absence of the witness. Most

44 Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining The Influence Of Amicus
Curiae ParticipationIn Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 807, 808 (2004)
(stating that submitting amicus briefs has an impact on whether or not the Supreme
Court grants certiorari).
45 Id. at 812 (arguing that the number of parties participating on a brief signals to the
court a broader support for a particular position).
46 See generally Rubin J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 315 (2008).
47 For articles on the impact of amicus briefs in Supreme Court litigation, see
generally Ruth Colker, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's Friends, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 517
(2007); Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603 (1984); Lee
Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. & POL. 639
(1993); L. Epstein & J. Knight, Mapping Out the Strategies Terrain: The Informational
Role of Amici Curiae, (1999), in SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL
APPROACHES (H. Gillman & C. W. Clayton eds., University of Chicago Press); Ed R.
Haden & Kelly Fitzgerald Pate, The Role of Amicus Briefs, 70 ALA. LAW. 114 (2009);
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749 (2000); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae
Brief From Friendship To Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963); Lynch, supra note 40; Paul
M. Collins, Jr. & Lisa A. Solowiej, Interest GroupParticipation,Competition, and Conflict
in the United States Supreme Court, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 955 (2007); William H.
Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 LAW
LIBR. J. 267 (2002); Mary-Christine Sungaila, Effective Amicus PracticeBefore the United
States Supreme Court:A Case Study, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 187 (1999); Dan
Schweitzer, Fundamentalsof Preparinga United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief, 5 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 523 (2003); Paul M. Smith, The Sometimes Troubled Relationship
Between Courts and Their "Friends",24 No. 4 LITIG. 24 (1998); Stephanie Tai, Friendly
Science: Medical, Scientific, and Technical Amici before the Supreme Court, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 789 (2000).
48 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
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domestic homicides take place within a relationship in which
there is already domestic violence. These defendants often intend
to silence their victims, particularly after the victim has sought
out and made statements to law enforcement. Yet, a specific
intent requirement ignores the broader context in which
domestic homicides occur and creates a high burden for the
prosecution to meet. Thus, critical evidence is lost when
requiring specific intent. The Amicus Curiae Brief of the
Battered Women's Justice Project and Other Domestic Violence
Organizations in Support of Respondent beautifully laid out for
the Court how such a rule would frustrate domestic homicide
prosecutions. 4 9
Although the Court ruled that specific intent was required
under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, it nevertheless gave
the issue of domestic violence particular attention. For example,
Justice Scalia noted at the end of the opinion:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a
victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct
designed to prevent testimony to police officers or
cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an
abusive relationship culminates in murder, the evidence
may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent
to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse
to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal
prosecution-rendering her prior statements admissible
under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of
abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from resorting to
outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as
would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which
the victim would have been expected to testify.50
Additionally, language by Justice Souter in his concurring
opinion suggests that intent could be "inferred on the part of the
domestic abuser in the classic abusive relationship."51 As
Professor Tom Lininger has argued, this language could be
helpful in crafting both legislation and legal arguments

49 Brief for The Battered Women's Justice Project & Other Domestic Violence
Organizations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct.
2678 (2008) (No. 07-6053), 2008 WL 859393.
50 Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2693.
51 Id. at 2695.
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regarding the admissibility of prior statements about abuse when
the Confrontation Clause is implicated.5 2 Such language, which
reflects a sophisticated understanding of domestic violence, is
likely directly attributable to the amicus briefs submitted by
those in the DVAC. Indeed, Justice Scalia notes the participation
of amici in the opinion, 53 and much of his discussion of domestic
violence seems intended to directly address the concerns that the
DVAC raised in their briefs. Besides laying the groundwork for
some statutory reform, such language is also of tremendous
assistance in subsequent cases, helping to build a coherent
narrative about the experience of intimate violence for victims,
families, and the community.
Providing the Court with data and analytic frameworks is
particularly important in domestic violence cases.
While
domestic violence may seem like a field that any layperson could
understand, the actual dynamics of such relationships are often
counter-intuitive. Similar to the need for expert testimony in
domestic abuse self-defense cases, amicus briefs can help explain
patterns of behavior that might otherwise appear inexplicable.
For example, it is easy to assume that a victim would decline to
provide testimony because she either wasn't abused or because
she wants the relationship to continue. An amicus brief can help
explain the dynamic of "separation assault" and why seeking
help from an outsider can be a dangerous strategy for a victim to
pursue.
Similarly, members of the Court may sometimes miss the
gendered implications of a case. Take, for example, Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Redding.54 The case involved the strip
search of a thirteen-year-old girl by school administrators who
thought that she might have over-the-counter drugs in her
possession. During oral argument, many of the Justices seemed
sympathetic towards school administrators, not the student.
Justice Ginsburg appeared frustrated with their questioning and
later told the press that her colleagues simply did not understand
52 Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding BatterersAccountable For Silencing
Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857 (2009). For a series of articles in response to Lininger's
proposals, see http'//www.texaslrev.comseealso/volume-87/lininger/.(last visited Apr. 20,
2010).
53 Giles, 128 S.Ct at 2687.
54 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009).

2010]

SUPREME COURTADVOCACYAND DV

what it is like for a thirteen-year-old girl to be searched. 55 Amici
in the case emphasized the trauma of such a search on girls,
thereby providing empirical support for Justice Ginsburg's
gendered insight. 56
Fourth, there are many benefits to filing amicus briefs beyond
influencing the outcome of any particular case. For example,
state and federal legislators may be more willing to pass
legislation favorable to domestic violence victims in response to
troublesome Supreme Court rulings if they can see the
arguments laid out in amicus briefs. The Justices, as well as
their clerks, become educated about domestic violence, making it
a more permanent part of their intellectual consciousness. 5 7
Amicus briefs are a valuable resource for scholars, lawyers, and
students. Submitting and then publicizing amicus briefs can help
unite and motivate others who work in the field as well as
victims themselves. The significance of domestic violence on the
Supreme Court's docket also helps encourage the best and
brightest new attorneys to pursue the field.
Fifth, as advocates working on behalf of people who have been
abused by their intimate partners, we have an obligation to
present their concerns to the Court even in cases where doing so
may not have much practical effect. What we do when we file
briefs is bear witness to the truths in people's lives, particularly
the lives of women and their children. Filing amicus briefs is not
just an act of advocacy, but an act of empowerment. 58
In this Essay, in order to encourage a robust and coordinated
Supreme Court strategy, I begin with an overview of Vermont v.
Brillon,59 a recent Supreme Court case involving the speedy trial
rights of criminal defendants. I was counsel of record in an
amicus brief filed on behalf of the Vermont Network of Domestic
55 Robert Barnes, Student Strip Search Illegal, WASH. POST, Jun. 26, 2009, available
at http'//www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/25/AR2009062501690
.html (noting Justice Ginsberg's comments about the Court's decision).
56 Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Social Workers and its Arizona
Chapter, the National Education Association, the National Association of School
Psychologists, the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American
Professional Society on the Abuse of Children in Support of Respondent, Safford Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 870022
(detailing the trauma of being strip-searched as an adolescent).
57 See Lynch, supra note 40, at 42.
58 See generally Garcia, supra note 46.
59 129 S.Ct. 1283 (2009)..
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and Sexual Violence and 17 other similar organizations. Drawing
upon this experience, I suggest some lessons that can be learned
from Brillon, as well as other cases before the Supreme Court.
Finally, I conclude with some optimistic thoughts about the
future of domestic violence issues before the Court.
II. VERMONT V. BRILLON
In March 2008, the Vermont Supreme Court issued a ruling in
Vermont v. Brillon60 that captured the interest of both the press
and the public. The defendant, Michael Brillon, was a habitual
domestic and sexual offender, with fourteen prior convictions,
including one for the sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old child.
In July 2001, he was arrested for assaulting his partner Michelle
Tatro with a baseball bat. The incident took place in front of her
young child.61 Because of his prior convictions, Brillon faced life
in prison if convicted. 6 2 The state appointed Brillon a public
defender. In the months that followed, Brillon attempted to fire
three of his six attorneys, causing each of them to withdraw. 63 He
even threatened the life of one of his attorneys. 6 4 A close
examination of the record revealed that he had fired attorneys in
other cases as well.6 5
In addition to delays caused by Brillon's own behavior, his
public defenders requested continuances that prolonged the pretrial process. 66 At least one of those continuances was requested
in order to find additional witnesses to impeach the victim's
character. 6 7 Another continuance appeared to be intended to
delay the trial until the assigned judge, whom Brillon feared
would be biased, rotated out of the county. 68 As a result of these
delays, it took three years for the case to reach trial. 69 At trial,
Brillon was convicted and received a twelve-to-twenty year
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108 (Vt. 2008).
Id. at 1113 (noting the details of the confrontation).
Id. at 1111.
See Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1291.
Id. at 1288.
Brillon, 955 A.2d at 1128-29.
Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1287-89.
See id. , 129 S. Ct. at 1288 n.4.
Id. at 1288 n.2.
Brillion, 955 A.2d at 1111.
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sentence. 70
Brillon appealed, claiming that the delays amounted to a
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 7 1 He
argued that because his attorneys either were not doing their job
- hence his reason for firing them - or were requesting
continuances because they were unprepared, the state was
therefore responsible for the delays. 7 2 The Vermont Supreme
Court agreed. 73 In applying the leading case on the issue, Barker
v. Wingo, 74 the Court found that most of the delays were
attributable to assigned counsels' unwillingness or inability to
move the case forward. 7 5 The Court further noted that it was
concerned about the under-funding of the public defender system
76
and urged the legislature to address the problem.
This was the first time that a court had held that delays
caused by a defendant and his court-appointed attorneys could be
counted against the state in a speedy trial analysis under Barker.
Of particular concern was that the rule set down by the Vermont
Supreme Court had the effect of treating delays requested by
public defenders differently than delays requested by private
counsel. Because the remedy for a speedy trial violation is
dismissal of the case, Brillon was released from prison.
After the decision, the Vermont Network Against Domestic and
Sexual Violence, 7 7 a statewide advocacy organization, became
concerned that domestic and sexual offenders, who often tried to
manipulate the trial process by attempting to fire lawyers and
requesting continuances, might now have added incentive to do
so in light of the Brillon decision. Those fears proved valid. In the
summer of 2008, two of Vermont's most widely known murder
suspects went on trial. The first, Brian Rooney, was accused of
raping and murdering University of Vermont student Michelle
Gardner-Quinn. The case drew national attention. Three weeks
after her disappearance, her body was found in a remote gorge;
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 Id. at 1121.
73 Id.
74 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
75 See Brillion, 955 A.2d at 1121, 1125.
76 Id. at 1126.
77 Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual Violence, httpJ/www.vtnetwork
.orglmain.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2010).
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she had been brutally raped and murdered. The second
defendant, Christopher Williams, had killed two people and shot
two others in a killing spree intended for his ex-girlfriend,
Andrea Lambesis. One of the victims was her mother, Linda
Lambesis. Williams killed Linda in her home as she was folding
his laundry. He also killed Alicia Shankes, Andrea's mentor and
fellow teacher, at the elementary school where the two were
preparing for the start of the school year.
Just after the Brillon decision, both Rooney and Williams
attempted to fire their attorneys for no clear reason just as their
trials were set to begin. Many speculated that the Brillon
decision had been the impetus for the attempted firings. 78 The
judges did not allow the attorneys to withdraw and both trials
proceeded as scheduled. But one unintended consequence of the
decision was that judges in Vermont began to look skeptically at
requests for continuances by assigned counsel, often refusing to
grant them for fear of dismissal under Brillon.79 In just a few
short months, Brillon was already creating problems in the
criminal justice system for victims and defendants.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
case its first day back in the October 2008-2009 term. Given that
the petition for certiorari had only been filed in July 2008, the
quickness with which the Court agreed to hear the case proved a
surprising but positive sign.
Admittedly, the first time that I became aware of the case was
when the Vermont Supreme Court issued its ruling. As a legal
analyst for local media (the joke in my family is that I am not
really a lawyer, but just play one on TV), I commented publicly
that I thought the case adversely impacted victims, and that the
Vermont Supreme Court had misapplied the law. I note this
because my involvement was completely happenstance. I likely
would never have focused on this case or appreciated the impact
the ruling would have for victims but for the intense public
78 See Adam Silverman, Suspects Ask to Fire Attorneys, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS,
Apr. 3, 2008, at 1A; Vermont Public Radio News: Lawyer for Suspect in Murder of Va.
Woman Wants off Case (VPR radio broadcast Apr. 25, 2008), available at
https'//www.vpr.net/newsdetail/80277/; see also Louis Porter & Patrick McArdle, High
Court to Revisit Brillon Decision, RUTLAND HERALD, Oct. 2, 2008, at B5, available at
http'//www.rutlandherald.com/apps/pbcs.dli/article?AID--/20081002/NEWS02/810020385/
10031NEWS02.
79 See Porter, supra note 78.
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interest the case generated in the media.
Because of my public comments, Christina Rainville of the
Bennington County State's Attorney's Office asked if I could help
with an amicus brief. At the time, I was teaching a seminar on
domestic violence and the law, and decided that this would be a
wonderful opportunity to have my class participate in writing the
brief. Rather than file a brief on my own behalf, as law professors
often do, we asked the Vermont Network to be our lead client
because it had already expressed concern about the impact of the
decision on victims. This was the right decision pedagogically as
well as strategically. Representing the Vermont Network gave
the students the opportunity to work with actual clients who
could provide insight into issues in the case. We also invited to
our class domestic violence victims, many who had been through
lengthy trials, to share their experiences so the students and I
would have a deeper appreciation for the real-world
consequences of our work.
We drafted a summary of the case and the argument and sent
it via e-mail to organizations nationwide that serve victims,
hoping to expand our list of amici and to gather as much input as
possible. Eventually, seventeen other organizations signed on,
including the DVLEAP, the BWPJ, and the NCEDV. In order to
get a full range of views and ideas, we scheduled a series of
conference calls in which every amici was invited to participate.
This open process of brainstorming with both lawyers and
service-providers proved invaluable.
It was through those early conference calls that we realized the
fine line we had to walk in the brief. All of our amici had
witnessed the kind of controlling behavior exhibited by Brillon
and the kind of gaming of the system that defense counsel often
engaged in to discourage victim participation. When cases are
delayed endlessly, victims often give up on the process and cease
to participate.0 Thus, defendants and their counsel already had
adequate incentive to delay trials through strategic manipulation
80 See generally Robert C. Davis et al., Prosecuting Domestic Violence Cases with
Reluctant Victims: Assessing Two Novel Approaches in Milwaukee, in LEGAL
INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 71,

71-72 (1997), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171666.pdf. In a study of specialized
domestic violence courts in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, researchers found that if cases were
efficiently processed, then conviction rates increased and that reducing the time it took
for a case to go to trial resulted in fewer defendants threatening or harming victims. Id.
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of the system. If such delays could be counted against the state,
resulting in dismissal, defendants and their counsel had every
incentive to continue delaying cases in the hope that either the
victim would decide not to proceed or that the case would be
dismissed for lack of a speedy trial.
Thus, the main goal of the brief was to help the Court
understand Brillon's behavior within the broader context of
domestic violence. It was crucial that the Court understand the
impact such delays have on victims and their families, including
the psychological, financial, and practical implications. It was
further important to show the Court how strategic delays by
defendants and their counsel frustrate the ability of the state to
prosecute domestic and sexual offenders. If the Court upheld the
Vermont Supreme Court's decision, the safety of victims and the
public would be at risk.
Yet, unlike the state, the interests of victims were more
complex than the simple argument that delays caused by state
appointed public defenders should never be counted against the
state for the purposes of a speedy trial analysis under Barker v.
Wingo.8 Victims of domestic and sexual assault often find
themselves as defendants in the criminal justice system.S2 We
recognized that it is in the best interests of victims, be they
victim-witnesses or defendants, to have a well-functioning public
defender system in which there is adequate counsel and timely
resolution. Our amici (as well as many of my defense-oriented
81 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (noting that a speedy trial analysis consists of balancing
four factors: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant).
82 See NAT'L COMM'N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE BD. OF DIRS., POSITION STATEMENTS:

WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS 1 (1994), available at
httpJ/www.ncchc.org/resources/statements/womenshealth2005.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2010) (guiding correctional administrators in the management of women's health,
including effects of sexual and physical abuse of women prisoners); LAWRENCE A.
GREENFIELD & TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

SPECIAL REPORT:

WOMEN OFFENDERS 1 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wo.pdf
("Nearly 6 in 10 women in State prisons had experienced physical or sexual abuse in the
past... ."); see also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRIOR
ABUSE REPORTED BY INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 1 1 (1999), availableat http://www.ojp

.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/parip.pdf (reporting that "between 23% and 37% of female offenders
reported they had been physically or sexually abused before age 18."); TRACY L. SNELL &
DANIELLE C. MORTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: WOMEN IN
PRISON: SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991 6 (1994), available at httpJ/www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/wopris.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) ("An estimated 50% of
women in prison who reported abuse said they had experienced abuse at the hands of an
intimate. .. ").
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law students) did not want us to adopt the state's theory that
delays caused by assigned counsel could never be attributable to
the state except in the most extreme circumstances, recognizing
that such a rule could unintentionally hurt victims when they are
defendants in cases.
After much discussion, we all agreed that rather than adopt
the state's bright-line rule, we would argue that there was a
distinction between delays caused by defendants and their
counsel, and delays attributable to the state public defender
system. Had Brillon not been assigned counsel for many months,
we would have agreed with the Vermont Supreme Court that
such a delay should be attributable to the state under the Sixth
Amendment, just as there is a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
as defined by Gideon v. Wainwright.8 3 So too could delays be
counted against the state had the delays requested by Brillon's
public defenders been attributable to over-crowded dockets,
inexperience, or other systemic breakdowns.
The only way for courts to determine whether delays were
caused by defendants and their counsel as part of the strategic
back-and-forth of litigation or by an over-burdened state public
defender system was to engage in the appropriate fact-finding. In
doing that fact-finding, we urged the Court to alert the trial and
appellate courts to the particular risks of defense delay tactics in
domestic and sexual violence cases and the consequences of those
delays on victims, the public, and the criminal justice system.
Neither the trial court nor the Vermont Supreme Court had
engaged in fact-finding relative to the question of a systemic
breakdown, and there was nothing in the record that suggested
the delays were attributable to the public defender system. While
we shared the concerns of the majority about adequate resources
for the public defender system, we argued that their ruling was
not supported by the facts.
Though the brief for the State of Vermont did discuss the
impact the Court's ruling would have on the criminal trial
process, it did so without specific concern for domestic and sexual
violence victims. The amicus briefs filed in support of the
83 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (concluding that there is a fundamental right of counsel in
criminal proceedings in federal and state courts (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936)).
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petitioner by the United States,84 the National Governor's
Association, 85 and the State of Utah and 38 other states, 86 did
not directly address the impact the Brillon decision would have
on victims, nor did any of those briefs acknowledge the
importance of a well-funded public defender system. Thus, our
brief brought to the Court two relevant matters not at issue in
any other brief: the broader context of domestic violence and an
alternative theory as to how delays ought to be assigned between
the defense and the state under a Barker v. Wingo analysis.
Two interesting observations can be made about the impact of
our brief. First, the Respondent's Brief on the Merits referenced
our brief in text four times, taking issue with our contention that
Brillon had incentive to delay the case for his own strategic
advantage and therefore was the actual cause of the delays.8 7
The counsel for Brillon refocused the Court's attention on
arguments not as fully laid forth in the Petitioner's Brief on the
Merits, and, by doing so, may have given our brief some
increased weight. These references to our brief may have
emphasized the argument that the Court should have examined
Brillon's behavior within a broader context of his need to
continue to exert power and control over both his victim and the
criminal justice system. They also may have highlighted how
pervasive such tactics are among domestic and sexual violence
offenders.
Second, to the extent that Brillon took direct issue with our
factual narrative, his amici, the American Civil Liberties Union,
the ACLU of Vermont and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys, in their brief, noted the clear distinction
between our position and that of the other amici in support of
Vermont. "Vermont's only non-government-affiliated amici (and
presumably the few amici without a financial stake in funding
indigent defense) 'agree that continuances and delays caused
solely by an indigent defendant's public defender can rise to a
84 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Vermont v.
Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009) (No. 08-88), 2008 WL 5009268.
85 Brief for The Nat'l Governors Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009) (No. 08-88), 2008 WL 5079037.
86 Brief for Utah et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Vermont v. Brillon, 129
S. Ct. 1283 (2009) Id. (No. 08-88), 2008 WL 4933583.
87 Brief of Respondent, Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009) (No. 08-88), 2008
WL 5266420.
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speedy trial violation if attributable to the inability or
unwillingness of the state public defender system to appoint
adequate counsel in a timely manner."' 8 8 Thus, while Brillon
disagreed with our broader narrative, his amici acknowledged
the similarity of our policy position to its own position. Given the
references to our brief by Brillon and his amici, I am reassured
that we communicated a reasonable approach that recognized the
complex interests of victims.
The Court rendered its decision in March 2009.89 (For a case
involving the lack of a speedy trial, this case was certainly a
speedy appeal - it took less than seven months from the filing of
the petition for certiorari to the final decision.) None of the
amicus briefs filed were cited in the relatively short and concise
opinion. While one can never know for certain what impact, if
any, a particular amicus brief has on a decision, we were
delighted that, in a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court held that delays caused by public defenders could not be
counted against the state in a defendant's claim that his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. 90 The
Court also held that under the analysis in Barker v. Wingo, 9 1
courts must take into account the defendant's disruptive and
aggressive behavior in the overall balance. 9 2 The Court found
particularly troubling that the defendant had fired three lawyers
and had threatened one of them. 93 The Court said that this rule
acknowledges that defendants may have incentive to employ
delay as a "defense tactic," and that, by delay, witnesses may
88 Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, (No. 08-88), 2008 WL 5417434 at 3 n.2, Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283
(2009) (citing Br. of Amici Curiae Vermont Network Against Domestic and Sexual
Violence et al. 26-27).
89 Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009).
90 Id. at 1291-92.
91 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
92 See Brillon, 129 S.Ct. at 1292.
"His strident, aggressive behavior with regard to Altieri, whom he threatened,
further impeded prompt trial and likely made it more difficult for the Defender
General's office to find replacement counsel ....Just as a State's 'deliberate attempt
to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against
the [Statel,' . . . so too should a defendant's deliberate attempt to disrupt proceedings
be weighted heavily against the defendant. Absent Brillon's deliberate efforts to force
the withdrawal of Ammons and Altieri, no speedy-trial issue would have arisen. The
effect of these earlier events should have been factored into the court's analysis of
subsequent delay." Id. (internal citation omitted).
93 See id.
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become unavailable. 94 It insisted that delays caused by private
counsel and state-paid counsel must be treated the same under
the Sixth Amendment. 95 Finally, the Court left open the
possibility that delays caused by a systemic breakdown of the
public defender system could be charged against the state if
supported by the record. 9 6 Brillon is the first case in which the
Court made clear that systemic delays can be counted against the
state in a speedy trial analysis.
Thus, Vermont v. Brillon removed incentive for a defendant
and his counsel to manipulate the court system in the hope that
the case will ultimately be dismissed for lack of a speedy trial. At
the same time, it ensured that state legislatures have adequate
incentive to provide counsel to indigent defendants. While we
were disappointed that the Court did not include any specific
language about the particular risks of strategic trial
manipulations in domestic and sexual assault cases, it did
emphasize that the Vermont Supreme Court had failed to give
adequate weight to the defendant's behavior. The holding is one
that well-serves the interests of victims be they witnesses or
defendants in the criminal process. In hindsight, it was well
worth the time and expense involved in filing an amicus brief. It
was a humbling and empowering experience for both me and my
students, and has gave me a much greater appreciation for the
importance, and the overwhelming demands, of Supreme Court
advocacy.

94 Id. at 1290. "[Diefendants may have incentives to employ delay as a 'defense tactic':
delay may 'work to the accused's advantage because 'witnesses may become unavailable
or their memories may fade' over time." (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 521).
95 See id. at 1290-91.
("Because 'the attorney is the [defendant's] agent when acting, or failing to act, in
furtherance of the litigation,' delay caused by the defendant's counsel is also
charged against the defendant .... The same principle applies whether counsel is
privately retained or publicly assigned, for '[o]nce a lawyer has undertaken the
representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the
lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a legal aid or defender
program.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
96 Id. at 1292. "The general rule attributing to the defendant delay caused by assigned
counsel is not absolute. Delay resulting from a systemic 'breakdown in the public defender
system' could be charged to the State." (internal citation omitted).
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III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM BRILLON AND OTHER CASES

A. Develop a deliberatestrategy to identify a wide-range of cases
that impact victims of domestic violence.
As noted earlier, there has been much excellent appellate work
on many cases affecting the interests of victims. Yet, there have
been cases in which the DVAC has not weighed in even though
the interests of victims were implicated. This has been
particularly true in criminal procedure cases that originate in the
states in which the interests of victims are often different from
that of the parties, or simply are not recognized by the parties.
For example, in Brillon, both the State's Attorney and Brillon's
counsel commented to me that the case "wasn't about victims."
As a result, none of the pleadings or briefs articulated in detail
any concerns that the decision could frustrate the ability to
prosecute domestic violence cases. It would have been easy to
miss this case as one implicating victims unless one did a more
thorough examination of the record. Indeed, it was only in a
rather sarcastic dissent by Justice Burgess in the Vermont
Supreme Court decision that noted Brillon's past domestic
97
violence record and his current manipulation of the system.
Although we were fortunate to have identified the case, as noted
above, it was purely by happenstance. I suspect that one of the
reasons that the DVAC didn't file briefs in either Georgia v.
Randolph or Crawford v. Washington was that the impact those
cases would have on victims also wasn't readily apparent from
either the records or the filings. An experienced attorney would
have had to carefully review those cases in order to identify the
98
potential impact on victims.
97 See State v. Brillon, 955 A.2d 1108, 1126 (2008) (Burgess, J., dissenting). "Today
the majority frees a convicted woman beater and habitual offender, not because of any
infirmity in the evidence or unfair prejudice in the trial by which the jury found him
guilty, but because the defendant delayed the proceedings for almost twenty-two months."
Id.
98 Ineffective assistance of counsel is one area of law in which there is potential to
develop a long-term strategy of Supreme Court advocacy. Victims of domestic violence,
particularly those convicted of killing an abusive spouse, often file ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. The Court hears many of these cases, yet the DVAC has not been proactive in reviewing these cases for the potential impact in victims. For a discussion of
domestic violence and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, see Sarah M. Buel,
Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct,

26 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 217 (2003).
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Beyond cases involving criminal law issues, there may be other
cases in which the DVAC might decide to file amicus briefs.
Take, for example, United States v. Stevens, 99 a case on the
Court's 2009-2010 docket. Stevens involves a federal statute that
bans depictions of animal cruelty.OO The question before the
Court is whether banning such depictions in order to prevent
animal cruelty is a compelling government interest under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. No one in the
DVAC filed an amicus brief in the case suggesting how animal
cruelty may affect broader concerns about intimate violence.
However, the interests of domestic violence victims are clearly
implicated in the case. For example, the Brief for a Group of
American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party101 agues that the link between animal cruelty and
domestic violence is well-established. It further discusses how
batterers often use animal abuse as a way in which to control
their partners, and details the growth of laws that provide
protection orders for pets.102 The few paragraphs that discuss
domestic violence are thoroughly researched and well-crafted.
These arguments support the conclusion that the Court ought to
find the prevention of animal cruelty a compelling government
interest because of its potential impact on humans. In addition,
briefs filed by other amici, including Florida and other states, 103
and the Humane Society of the United States, 104 as well as the
government's brief of the merits, briefly mention the relationship
between domestic violence and animal cruelty. 105
While the interests of domestic violence victims may not be
central, the case did present a unique opportunity to educate the
99 533 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 1984 (2009). For a preview of
the case, see Cheryl Hanna & Pamela Vesilind, Preview of United States v. Stevens:
Animal Law, Obscenity, and the Limits of Government Censorship,4 CHARLESTON L. REV.
59 (2009).
100 18 U.S.C.A. § 48 (West. 2009).
101 Brief for A Group of American Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 21, United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2008) (No. 08-769),
2009 WL 1681459.
102 See id. at 22-23.
103 Brief of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v.
Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2008) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1703214 at 14.
104 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Humane Society of the U.S. Supporting Petitioner,
United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2008) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1681460.
105 Brief for the Petitioner, United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir. 2008)
(Jun. 15, 2009) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1615365, at 32.
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Court on the relationship between animal cruelty and domestic
violence. It would have been preferable to have lawyers from the
DVAC submit even a short brief on the topic rather than rely on
other parties to do so. Furthermore, the DVAC need not have
filed on behalf of the government if it had concerns about the
suppression of free speech at issue under the statute. Rather, the
DVAC could have filed a brief in support of neither party, just as
the Group of American Law Professors did, thus using the case
as an opportunity to educate the Court about a specific aspect of
the case without wading into the murky questions posed by the
First Amendment.
In order to identify a wider range of cases, the DVAC should
consider a coordinated Supreme Court project, in which every
petition for certiorari is reviewed and evaluated for its potential
impact on the interests of domestic violence victims. It might also
be helpful to provide training and guidance to both state and
national coalitions on how to review lower court opinions for their
potential impact and provide a forum to discuss potential
involvement at earlier stages in the process. To that end, it would
be helpful to establish a network of attorneys and scholars who
have expertise and experience in Supreme Court litigation and
constitutional law. Such a network could easily communicate
electronically. While this approach would require resources and
funding, it is an effort that could have important long-term
consequences for victims.
Analyses of the effectiveness of amicus briefs suggest that the
Court often pays particular attention to briefs filed by
experienced lawyers and organizations that frequently file
amicus briefs, such as the ACLU.106 There is nothing preventing
the DVAC from becoming a trusted advocate before the Court as
well, particularly as DVLEAP takes on more and more of these
cases. Indeed, given the outstanding work done in many recent
cases, it is worth considering expanding the DVAC's participation
in both the number and the types of cases in order to enhance its
reputation before the Court.

106 Lynch, supra note 40, at 49-52. See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 47
(discussing success patterns of amicus curiae briefs filled by the ACLU).
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B. Ensure that only the DVAC advances the interests of victims.
Georgia v. Randolph107 serves as a wake-up call to the
importance of the DVAC being involved in a range of cases and
defining its own interests rather than allowing its interests to be
defined by other parties or particular Justices. The question
before the Court in Randolph was whether one co-occupant could
consent to a search of the home if another present co-occupant
objected. The case involved a couple who had been experiencing
marital problems, although, as noted earlier, there was nothing
in the record to indicate whether or not the husband had abused
his wife. The police came to the home after the wife notified them
that her husband had taken their son. When the police arrived,
the wife told them that her husband used drugs and invited them
to search the house. The husband objected to the search. Relying
on the wife's consent over the husband's objection, the police
searched and found a straw with cocaine traces on it and
arrested the husband. The Court held in a 5-3 decision (Justice
Alito did not participate) that the police cannot search if one cooccupant objects under the theory that one co-occupant cannot
waive the constitutional rights of other.
In the decision, four of the six opinions directly discussed the
impact the holding would have on the ability of the police to
respond to domestic violence. Justice Souter, writing for the
majority, recognized that domestic violence was a serious
problem in the United States, but argued that the Court's
decision would not impact the ability of the police to protect
domestic violence victims. Justice Breyer, in a concurring
opinion, reiterated Souter's insistence that the holding would not
frustrate law enforcement's ability to respond to domestic abuse
because the risk of exigent circumstances provides an exception
to the consent requirement. 108
In contrast, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia
claimed that the holding would harm victims. Chief Justice
Roberts was particularly concerned that the doctrine of exigency
would not suffice to account adequately for the realities of
domestic violence calls, especially when the victim may not
107 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
108 Id. at 125-27 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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appear injured or in danger. 109 Justice Scalia argued that the
case has nothing to do with formal equality between the sexes as
Justice Stevens noted in his concurring opinion.ll 0 Rather, he
argued, "[g]iven the usual patterns of domestic violence, how
often can police be expected to encounter the situation in which a
man urges them to enter the home while a woman
simultaneously demands that they stay out?"'l
The most disturbing part of the decision is that Justices make
empirical assertions without any empirical evidence to support
those assertions. Is Justice Souter or Chief Justice Roberts
correct about the impact of the holding on victims? We don't
know in part because no one in the DVAC weighed in on the case.
Rather, the interests of domestic violence victims were only
addressed in one paragraph in the brief filed by the United
States as amicus curiae.1 1 2 As a result, the Justices were free to
speculate about the interests of victims without any input from
victims themselves. This is exactly the kind of situation that
must be avoided in the future.
Admittedly, Georgia v. Randolph is a very difficult case for the
domestic violence community, and I suspect there is some
disagreement over whether the Court reached the correct
decision. For example, Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer, one of
the leading scholars in the field of domestic violence, has
expressed concern that the decision puts increased pressure on
the doctrine of exigency. As did Chief Justice Roberts, she argues
that the doctrine of exigency is too narrow to adequately respond
to the kinds of situations in which there is an ongoing threat of
abuse. 113 She suggests, albeit not directly, that she disagrees
with the Court's holding.
In contrast, although I share Professor Tuerkheimer's concern
about the doctrine of exigency as applied to domestic abuse
situations, theoretically at least, I agree with the holding. While I
109 Id. at 139-40 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Davis, 290 F.3d
th
1239, 1240-41 (10 Cir. 2002).
110 Id. at 145 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 142 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112 See Brief for United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Georgia v.
Randolph at 22, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (No. 04-1067), 2005 WL 1453877,
113 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (2007). "Whether
circumstances are exigent cannot be understood without consideration of a relationship
characterized by the ongoing exercise of power and control." Id. at 803.
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am critical of Justice Souter's references to a "man's home is his
castle" reasoning, I am particularly persuaded by Justice
Steven's concurring opinion in which he directly addresses the
issue of gender equality. "[Elach of the partners has a
constitutional right that he or she may independently assert or
waive. Assuming that both spouses are competent, neither one is
a master possessing the power to override the other's
constitutional right to deny entry to their castle." 114 While
Justice Stevens does not discuss domestic violence, he does reject
any historical notion of the doctrine of coverture that served as
the legal justification for men to chastise their wives. Thus, in
this case, I would argue that the long-term interests of victims
are more aligned with criminal defendants than with the state.
I raise this point of disagreement to acknowledge that there is
tension in the DVAC on the extent to which the interests of
victims align with the interests of the state, particularly in the
context of criminal law. A number of scholars have expressed
15
concern that the movement has become too conservative.1
There is further concern that courts are using arguments about
the need to respond aggressively to domestic violence by
expanding police power and that, as a result, the victim's
autonomy has been compromised. Georgia v. Randolph is a hard
case because it falls on the fault-line of this valid and important
debate.
But this debate need not prevent the DVAC from having some
input into the case, at the very least to prevent the government
or particular Justices from co-opting a position. It is interesting
to contemplate how the DVAC might have weighed in on Georgia
v. Randolph. For example, it could have filed a brief which raised
concerns about the relationship between domestic violence and
the doctrine of exigency as Professor Tuerkheimer now has,
without filing in support of either party. This would have been
particularly helpful given that in Hammon v. Indiana, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, rejected the proposition that when the police respond to
114 Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, at 125 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring).
115 See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 741, 753-54 (2007).
See generally G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence,
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. Rev. 237
(2005).
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a domestic violence call and the police do not witness any ongoing
violence, there is no on-going emergency.11 6 This position seems
to directly contradict the Chief Justice's concern in Randolph
that there could be an on-going emergency in the domestic
violence case when one party objects to a search of the home. An
amicus brief focused on exigency would likely have been very
instructive for the Court.
Additionally, the DVAC could have provided the Court with a
brief that outlined the potential impact of the decision on
domestic violence cases without necessarily advocating for a
particular bright-line rule, similar to Justice Breyer's argument.
Or, through a process by which different perspectives were
discussed, it might have reached some consensus on which
position was consistent with the long-term goals of victims.
It is true that such a process can be difficult to implement
within the relatively short time one has to file a brief once the
petition for certiorari is granted. Nevertheless, with modern
technology, there are certainly ways to efficiently gather input
from different people with different perspectives in formulating
strategy, especially if cases are flagged early in the petition
process. Indeed, in our experience with Brillon, it was in those
early conference calls that included victims and non-lawyers in
which our best strategizing took place. We started with the
philosophy that no one person or organization had the right
answer or had ownership over the substance of the brief. Rather,
it was our view that, as counsel, we should facilitate input to
reach as broad a consensus as possible among those who had an
interest in the case.
It is worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice
Scalia, also dissented in United States v. Hayes.117 In that
116 See Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 829-30 (2006).
There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified that he
had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break anything.
When the officers first arrived, Amy told them that things were fine, and there
was no immediate threat to her person. When the officer questioned Amy for the
second time, and elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to
determine (as in Davis ) "what is happening," but rather 'what happened."
Objectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the
interrogation was to investigate a possible crime-which is, of course, precisely
what the officer should have done.
Id.
117 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009).
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dissent, Roberts is completely unconcerned about the impact the
Court's decision would have on domestic violence victims. This
kind of on-again, off-again, concern for victims indeed fuels the
criticism that some members of the Court have no genuine
concern for domestic violence victims. My own sense is such
analysis isn't entirely helpful to the long-term interests of
victims. After all, Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority
opinion in Giles v. California, rather than joining Justice
Steven's dissent, which detailed tremendous concern for the
Court's ruling on domestic violence victims. 118 No one could
legitimately suggest that Justice Ginsburg only cares about
victims of domestic violence when it serves her broader agenda.
Additionally, Justice Thomas' opinion in Davis & Hammon, in
which he concurs in part, and dissents in part, shows some of the
most sophisticated understanding of what happens when the
police respond to a domestic violence call.1 19 Yet, I suspect that
many casual observers of the Court might assume that Justice
Thomas is indifferent, if not hostile, to the concerns of victims.
In cases that implicate domestic violence, every Justice evinces
some relative inconsistency, which is to be expected. Advocates
should not expect any Justice to put the concerns of domestic
violence victims ahead of broader Constitutional principles or
statutory interpretation. To the extent that we are critical of
cases, it should be because the Court got the law wrong, not
because it didn't properly account for the impact of its rulings on
victims. To that end, it is important to assume that no Justice on
the Court believes that anyone should have legal sanction to
abuse an intimate partner, and to assume that every Justice is
open to education and persuasion by the DVAC.

118 See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2698-708 (2008) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
119 547 U.S. at 841 (Thomas, J. concurring in the judgment part and dissenting in
part). However, the fact that the officer in Hammon was investigating Mr. Hammon's
past conduct does not foreclose the possibility that the primary purpose of his inquiry was
to assess whether Mr. Hammon constituted a continuing danger to his wife, requiring
further police presence or action. It is hardly remarkable that Hammon did not act
abusively towards his wife in the presence of the officers, and his good judgment to refrain
from criminal behavior in the presence of police sheds little, if any, light on whether his
violence would have resumed had the police left without further questioning,
transforming what the Court dismisses as "past conduct" back into an "ongoing
emergency."
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C. The DVAC should have no particularloyalty to either the state
or the defense.
Even though in many cases the interests of the victims will be
more aligned with the state than with the defense, the DVAC
should not shy away from supporting the defense when
warranted. Take, for example, Dixon v. United States.120 The
defendant, Keshia Dixon purchased multiple firearms at two gun
shows, during the course of which she provided an incorrect
address and falsely stated that she was not under indictment for
a felony.121 She was convicted on one count of receiving a firearm
while under indictment and eight counts of making false
statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm.12 2 At
trial, Dixon admitted that she knew she was under indictment
when she made the purchases and that she knew doing so was a
crime; her defense was that she acted under duress because her
boyfriend threatened to kill her or hurt her daughters if she did
not buy the guns for him. 123
There were two questions before the Court. The first was
whether the defendant had to prove a defense of duress by a
preponderance of the evidence, to which the Court answered
yes. 124 The second was whether the government had to disprove
a duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt, to which the Court
answered no. 125 The burden of persuasion remained with the
defendant,126 which makes proving a duress defense particularly
difficult. Battered women defendants often raise the defense of
duress, as did Keshia Dixon. Thus, the case had implications for
victims well beyond the facts of the particular case.
The National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered
Women joined with the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers in an amicus brief to argue that the government should
bear the burden of proof.12 7 The brief itself made little mention of
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
for the
States,

548 U.S. 1 (2006).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 15-17.
Id. at 17.
See Brief of The Natl Assoc. of Criminal Def. Lawyers & The Nat'l Clearinghouse
Def. of Battered Women as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Dixon v. United
548 U.S. 1 (2006) (No. 05-7053), 2006 WL 501634.
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the impact of the decision on victims. 1 28 Rather, it set forth an
argument based largely on history and doctrine. 12 9 It was an
excellent brief. Even though the Court ultimately ruled in favor
of the Government, the case serves as an important reminder
that the interests of the state are not always aligned with the
interests of victims.
In addition to the brief filed by the National Clearinghouse for
the Defense of Battered Women, there was also the opportunity
for the DVAC to submit an additional amicus brief. For example,
a coalition of national organizations might have filed a second
brief pointing out the policy implications of the Court's decision
on battered defendants. It might have detailed for the Court the
empirical realities faced by battered defendants, and the
evidentiary hurdles presented when the burden of persuasion
remains with the defense. Had other organizations unaffiliated
with the defense bar weighed in, it might have signaled to the
government that it should not selectively support domestic
violence victims in cases that expand government power but
abandon them in cases which limit it. I share the concerns of
many advocates that prosecutors are all too quick to abandon the
interests of victims when doing so no longer serves their objective
in aggressive law enforcement.
The broader points are these: first, we should not shy away
from hard cases, and second, we do not owe loyalty to either the
state or the defense bar in criminal cases. Advocates, scholars,
and lawyers for victims are becoming increasingly sophisticated.
With that sophistication comes differing opinions, but also rich
and nuanced approaches that get to the heart of the concern over
the relationship between private intimate violence and concerns
over full citizenship and equality. Even in those cases in which
there is legitimate disagreement over the best position relative to
the holding, the DVAC is certainly mature enough to provide the
Court with some empirical and theoretical guidance.
Furthermore, the DVAC should be cognizant that other
interest groups, as well as the government, may strategically
invoke the interests of domestic violence victims in order to
garner the Court's support for their broader concerns. For
128 See id.
129 See id.
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example, one issue raised by District of Columbia v. Heller130 was
whether or not the right to bear arms for self-defense will
ultimately hurt or help victims of domestic abuse. In the dissent,
Justice Stevens notes that just as a handgun in the home can be
used for self-defense, so too can it be used to engage in acts of
domestic violence.13 1 He cited the brief filed by the National
Network to End Domestic Violence132 and numerous domestic
violence organizations. The brief argued:
One particularly ominous statistic stands out in its
relevance here: domestic violence accounts for between
one-third and almost one-half of the female murders in
the United States. These murders are most often
committed by intimate partners with handguns. And
while murder is the most serious crime that an abuser
with a gun can commit, it is not the only crime; short of
murder, batterers also use handguns to threaten,
intimidate, and coerce victims. Handguns empower
batterers and provide them with deadly capabilities,
exacerbating an already pervasive problem .....
.... The D.C. Council had ample empirical justifications
for determining that such laws were the best method for
reducing gun violence in the District. Important
government interests support statutes and regulations
intended to reduce the number of domestic violence
incidents that turn deadly; such statutes should be given
substantial deference.133
Yet, the Court was also presented with an opposing point of
view. An amicus brief filed by women academics and state
legislators argued that women should not have to depend on men
for their protection and that equality demands that women have
the right to bear arms:
Violence against women in the United States is
endemic, often deadly, and most frequently committed
by men superior in physical strength to their female
130 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
131 Id. at 2864 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id.
133 Brief for Nat'l Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, at 18, 19, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008)
(No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157199.
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victims.
The District's current prohibition against handguns
and immediately serviceable firearms in the home
effectively eliminates a woman's ability to defend her
very life and those of her children against violent
attack. Women are simply less likely to be able to
thwart violence using means currently permitted
under D.C. law. Women are generally less physically
strong, making it less likely that most physical
confrontations will end favorably for women. Women
with access to immediately disabling means, however,
have been proven to benefit from the equalization of
strength differential a handgun provides. Women's
ability to own such serviceable firearms is indeed of
even greater importance given the holdings of both
federal and state courts that there is no individual
right to police protection ....
What the District's current firearms laws do is
manifest "gross indifference" to the self-defense needs
of women. Effectively banning the possession of
handguns ignores biological differences between men
and women, and in fact allows gender-inspired
violence free rein. Those biological differences should,
under these limited circumstances, be influential to
the Court's decision. 134
These differing points of view about the Second Amendment
and gender equality invite a rich, substantive debate that is
beyond the scope of this article. However, this debate highlights
the importance of filing amicus briefs in all cases that have some
impact on victims so that the DVAC presents a consistent voice
before the Court. I do not suggest that other groups who claim to
represent the interests of victims before the Court are
disingenuous in their concerns. Rather, it is easier for those who
do not have a long-standing commitment to ending violence
against women to pick and choose their issues without concern
for a broader strategy and litigation objectives. Consistent,
repeated briefs before the Court filed by the same organizations

134 Brief of126 Women State Legislators & Academics as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, at 2, 3, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290),
2008 WL 383523.
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is the best strategy if the DVAC hopes to ultimately have a
significant impact upon the Court's decision-making.
D. Continue to strengthen the strategicalliance with advocates for
reproductive health and sexual autonomy.
The alliance between advocates for domestic violence and
advocates for reproductive health and sexual autonomy has been
enormously important and should continue to be fostered in the
context of Supreme Court advocacy. At the core of cases involving
reproductive rights and sexual autonomy is the question of
women's equality and full citizenship. No where is this better
articulated than in Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Gonzales v.
Carhart in which she wrote, "legal challenges to undue
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman's
autonomy to determine her own life's course, and thus to enjoy
equal citizenship stature." 135 That fundamental question of
women's equality also lies at the heart of domestic violence cases.
Even though domestic violence affects men as well as women, the
historic, legal justification for chastisement as well as the
empirical reality that women are far more likely to be victimized
than men suggests that modern domestic violence remains
deeply rooted in a broader legal and social culture that treated
women as the inferior sex. Building strategic alliances before the
Court could positively influence the Court's interpretation of
constitutional principles as they affect broader questions of
gender equality.
The alliance between the DVAC and advocates for reproductive
rights was critical in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,136 in which
the Court struck down Pennsylvania's spousal notification
statute as creating an undue burden on a woman's qualified right
to terminate her pregnancy. The Court went to great lengths to
document how domestic violence impacts a woman's sexual
autonomy and thus how requiring spousal notification, would
further compromise her safety. The early and ongoing
involvement of domestic violence advocates, particularly the
135 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
136 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence,13 7 was
instrumental to the success of this portion of the case.
Similarly, the amicus brief filed by the National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthoodof N.
New England138 highlights the importance of this strategic
alliance even in reproductive cases where the impact on victims
of domestic violence may be less obvious. At issue in Ayotte was
whether New Hampshire's parental notification law, which
contained no exception for the health of the pregnant minor, was
constitutional. The NCDV argued that abused and neglected
teens are at increased risk for medical emergencies requiring
immediate abortions, 139 and that New Hampshire law was
unconstitutional because it endangered the health of those young
women who had been abused or neglected. While the Court
remanded the case on the question of remedy, it was still
important that the particular concerns of minors who have been
abused was squarely before the Court, especially considering the
Court's stated concern for the impact of laws that regulate
abortion of victims of domestic violence as articulated in
Casey.140

There is also opportunity for creating strategic alliances with
advocates working on issues of sexual violence. One of the most
satisfying experiences in filing the amicus brief in Brillon was
working with the Victim's Rights Law Center (VRLC), 141 which is
dedicated to the needs of victims of sexual assault and rape. I
had previously worked with Jessie Mindlin of VRLC on an
amicus brief in a case before the Kentucky Supreme Court
concerning a civil rape shield statute, which is how VRLC
became involved in Brillon. While the focus of VRLC is primarily
on non-intimate sexual violence, the interests of their
constituency closely matched the interests of domestic violence
victims, many of whom are also victims of sexual violence. Both
137 Nation's First State Domestic Violence Coalition, http://www.pcadv.org (last
visited Apr. 20, 2010).
138 Brief of Nat'l Coalition Against Domestic Violence, et al. Supporting Respondents,
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 807 (2005) (No. 04-1144),
2005 WL 2598159.
139 Id.
140 See 505 U.S. 833, 888-92.
141 Victim Rights Law Center, http'/www.victimrights.org/ (last visited Apr. 20,
2010).
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sex offenders and domestic violence offenders exhibit similar
patterns of controlling and manipulative behavior. In many cases
these offenders have victimized women and children with whom
they have had a prior relationship, as well as strangers. In both
types of cases, there is often victim reluctance to proceed to trial.
To capture these more universal concerns about the impact of
the Court's ruling on violence against women, we framed the
issue as one involving victims of domestic and sexual violence.
Yet, our amicus brief primarily focused on those victimized in the
context of intimate relationships. Thus, there was a missed
opportunity to file a second brief that would have expanded upon
arguments as they related to non-intimate sexual assault and
rape victims, both children and adults. In the future, particularly
in cases involving criminal procedure, fostering more strategic
alliances can bring to the Court's attention both the
commonalities and the unique challenges that its rulings will
have on victims of domestic and sexual violence.
CONCLUSION

The Domestic Violence Advocacy Community can be very proud
of its Supreme Court participation. Beginning with Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, it has done a superb job of providing the
Court with empirical facts and data, bearing witness to the
realities of the lives of abuse victims. It has presented thoughtful,
cogent arguments that reflect a developing legal maturity. The
Court continues to recognize domestic violence as a wide-spread
and serious problem. Even when its rulings have been adverse to
the interests of victims, the Court has often gone out of its way to
acknowledge the seriousness of the problem and invite legislative
solutions. The Court's increased awareness of domestic violence,
and its increasing sophistication in recognizing the dynamics of
abuse are in no small measure attributable to the DVAC's active
role in Supreme Court litigation.
It is my hope that lawyers, scholars, and advocates who work
on behalf of victims can continue and strengthen that
involvement by being more deliberate in reviewing petitions for
certiorari, by expanding our advocacy to include a wider range of
cases, by ensuring that only committed domestic violence
advocates define the interests of victims, and by fostering
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alliances with those advocacy groups committed to sexual
autonomy and reproductive rights. This strategy is resource
intensive and often yields few, if any, easily discernable
immediate results. But a long-term commitment to identifying
the interests of victims and providing the Court with empirical
facts and theoretical frameworks is likely to yield long-term
results. Perhaps most importantly, filing amicus briefs gives
victims a voice in the nation's highest Court, and I remain
eternally optimistic that those voices are being heard.

